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The Power to Do What Manifestly
Must Be Done: Congress, the
Freedmen's Bureau, and
Constitutional Imagination
John M. Bickers*

I. INTRODUCTION

We start with first principles. The Constitution creates a
Federal Government of enumerated powers. See Art. I, § 8.
As James Madison wrote, "the powers delegated by the
proposed Constitution to the federal government are few
and defined. Those which are to remain in the State
governments are numerous and indefinite. '
These words of the late Chief Justice William Rehnquist,
seemingly beyond argument, nonetheless announced another
pivotal change in the understanding of the Constitution.
Although the stakes in United States v. Lopez were seemingly
minor - a sentence to six months of confinement for the possession
2
of a .38 caliber handgun and five bullets by a high school senior the constitutional change wrought by the Court's opinion was
dramatic. The 1995 case signaled the end of one of the longer
Assistant Professor of Law, Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Northern
Kentucky University. I owe special thanks to Alexander Aleinikoff, whose
teaching provided the inspiration for this work; to Jeffrey D. Jackson, who
*

offered early and valuable advice; and to Mark Welton, who helped me to put
it in final form. I wholly own any remaining errors.
1. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (quoting THE
FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
2. Id. at 551-52.
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trends in American judicial history, a deference to Congress that
had begun in 1937. 3 A decade later, as the Rehnquist Court
ended, it was clear that one of the primary features of that Court
was the revival of a more activist role in assessing the powers of
4
Congress.
At one level, there is nothing at all controversial about the
Chief Justice's assertion of first principles. The observation of
James Madison he quoted may represent the single most settled
doctrine in the annals of United States Constitutional Law.
Agreement is virtually complete that the government of the
United States is a federal one, that it exercises only limited
powers. The characterization of a particular power as belonging
to Washington or the States, however, has been anything but
settled. Prodigious amounts of ink have been spilt trying to sort
out what the proper boundaries of the federal system are, and
what institutions are responsible for policing those borders. All
sides in this perpetual debate in our nation's history concede that
power has ebbed and flowed between the federal government and

3. See Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1 (1937).
4. Not all commentators agree, of course. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, A
COURT DIVIDED: THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW 252 (2005) ("From 1937 to the Rehnquist Court federalism meant
nothing as a restriction on Congress's power.
The Rehnquist Court's
federalism revolution consisted of replacing that zero with something more
than zero. But not much more."). It remains true, however, that the Court in
Lopez applied scrutiny to an action by Congress under the Commerce Clause,
which was far stricter than any that had been applied since the New Deal.
The revolution that was to follow has admittedly taken place only
sporadically. The Court did strike down the Violence Against Women Act,
see United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), but it found that Congress
had the authority to enact the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA),
Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003), and
the Americans with Disabilities Act, Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
Although the relevant power of Congress in the latter two cases was the
enforcement power of the fifth section of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is
worth noting that even one of the dissenters in those cases noted that the
FMLA was "likely a valid exercise of Congress' power under the Commerce
Clause." See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 759 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). More recently,
the Court found that the power of States to permit medicinal use of
marijuana was preempted by the Controlled Substances Act, finding that
Congress might even regulate an item that was not itself in commerce
pursuant to a regulatory scheme. See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195
(2005).
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state capitals, but disagree about whether such shifts have been
right.
Indeed, something of a canonical history has grown up about
these shifts between central and state power. Every American
law student learns the story of the limitations stressed by Publius
in the effort to have the Constitution ratified, 5 and of the
expansive reading given the powers of Congress by the Great
Chief Justice, John Marshall, in cases like Gibbons v. Ogden 6 and
McCulloch v. Maryland.7 Typical analysis of the Constitution
then skips ahead to the end of the nineteenth century, when the
Supreme Court was devoted to a doctrine of laissez-faire
economics.
That activist Court batted down attempts by
Congress,8 and even by state legislatures, 9 to regulate the
American economy. The traditional story then tells of the Court's
reversal: the decision - whether as part of an intentional
constitutional revision in response to popular demand,' 0 or a
5. Publius, of course, was the nom de plume of Alexander Hamilton,
John Jay, and James Madison, whose editorials seeking New York's
ratification of the Constitution were collected as THE FEDERALIST PAPERS.
6. 22 U.S. 1 (1824). In finding Congress's power to regulate commerce
among the states extended even to waterways within states, such as the
Hudson River, Marshall in one stroke transformed the interstate commerce
clause into a potential source of real power.
7. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
Marshall's famous decision that federal
instrumentalities were immune from state taxation provided some slight
breathing room for the National Bank; although it would die at the hands of
President Jackson, this decision, too, would become extraordinarily
significant due in large part to the Chief Justice's phrasing of the proper test
for evaluating a federal power: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the
scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the
letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." Id. at 420.
8. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
Ignoring the
methodology of McCulloch, the Court in that case struck down congressional
limitation of the transport in interstate commerce of goods made with child
labor. In responding to the argument that elimination of congressional
regulation of this kind would today be called a race to the bottom, the Court
pronounced that "there is no power vested in Congress to require the States
to exercise their police power so as to prevent possible unfair competition."
Id. at 273. This was particularly ironic, considering that the Court had
sharply cut back on state regulatory power, see infra note 9.
9. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Here, the right of bakers
to work more than sixty hours a week was held to be "part of the liberty of
the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution." Id. at 53.
10.

See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 333-42
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thoughtful development of doctrine 1 - to reverse those cases and
recognize a very broad power of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce.

12

This newly discovered - or rediscovered - deference

to Congress led to perhaps the tale's most astounding chapter.
For in the 1960's, Congress passed a series of civil rights laws,
based in part on the Commerce Clause. The Court accepted this
interpretation of federal power, 13 a power that now seemed
unchecked, and was, perhaps, uncheckable. 14 That deference may
have ended in 1995, although it is probably still too early to tell.
This canonical story of ebbing and waning power of the
federal government is, though, incomplete. The emphasis in this
telling is on the courts, especially the Supreme Court. This is an
understandable focus of lawyers in common law systems, trained
since Bracton to find the law in the pronouncements of the
judiciary. 15 But it does not fairly capture the intricacies of our
system: if the acts of Congress and the actions of the Executive are
taken seriously only when they make their way onto the crowded
and limited docket of the Supreme Court, our constitutional
6
system will never be truly understood.'
(1998).
11. See BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW
STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998).

12.

DEAL COURT:

THE

See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v.

Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).

13. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964);
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
14. Indeed, by the mid-1980s, one constitutional scholar could theorize
that 'federalism' has all but ceased to be a meaningful word-concept in the
vocabulary of American jurisprudence." MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT
WOULD Go OF ITSELF: THE CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN CULTURE 319 (1986).

As late as 1990, a textbook referred to the commerce power as making
"federal regulation possible in virtually every conceivable circumstance."
MALCOLM M. FEELEY & SAMUEL KRISLOV, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 178 (2d ed.
1990).
15. "By the time of the treatise called 'Bracton' (c. 1220-50), the influence
of judicial decisions is apparent on the face of the text. The author of the
preface expressly stated that he had written in order to prevent the newer
generation of judges from unwittingly leaving the right course settled by
their wise predecessors." J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL
HISTORY 171 (2d ed. 1979). Professor Baker used the name Bracton for the
treatise rather than its author in deference to the modern scholarship that
suggests Henry de Bracton merely amended, rather than authoring it. See

id. at 161.
16.

This idea, which is today unorthodox in many American law schools,
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As a mild tonic against this focus on courts only, this Article
proposes to examine our federal Constitution by considering the
example of one of the odder entities in American legal history: the
Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands. This
agency, more commonly called the Freedmen's Bureau, existed
from the late days of the Civil War through the end of
Reconstruction. It did extraordinary, unprecedented things. It
spent all of its days in turmoil, beset by enemies on many sides. 17
It is now, unfortunately, largely forgotten.18
The Freedmen's Bureau, like the rest of Reconstruction, was
subjected to a withering historical criticism in the late years of the
nineteenth century and much of the twentieth. 19 More recent
historians have reevaluated the period, puncturing the
stereotypes of the Carpetbagger and the Scalawag that have
dominated mainstream thinking for too long. 20 The Freedmen's
Bureau has not been exempt from this review: although recent
historians have been rightly unwilling to mask its flaws and
limitations, they have embraced a more even-handed review of its
legitimate achievements in attempting to accomplish a very
21
difficult mission.
has probably counted among its adherents Thomas Jefferson, Andrew
Jackson, and Abraham Lincoln.
17. ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION:
1866-1876,
at 22-23 (2005).
18. The Bureau has recently received the benefit of more serious

THE FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND CIVIL RIGHTS,

scholarship, due to a long-overdue bit of legislation. This recent statute is
designed to preserve the records of its work, records of vital importance to
genealogical studies of the African-American community as well as social
historians of this pivotal period.
See Freedmen's Bureau Records
Preservation Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-444, 114 Stat. 1929 (2000).
19. The classic texts include such works as PAUL SKEELS PEIRCE, THE

BUREAU: A CHAPTER IN THE HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION
(Scholarly Press 1970) (1904) and GEORGE R. BENTLEY, A HISTORY OF THE
FREEDMEN'S BUREAU (1955) [hereinafter BENTLEY]. Although such works are
not as consistently critical of the Bureau as some histories of other aspects of
Reconstruction, they assume it to have done at least as much evil as good.
Bentley, for example, concludes that the Bureau "sought too much for the
Negro too soon" and thus "fed the flame of race hostility." BENTLEY, at 214.
FREEDMEN'S

20. See, e.g., ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION 1863-1877 (1988); RICHARD NELSON CURRENT, THOSE TERRIBLE
CARPETBAGGERS (1988); GEORGE C. RABLE, BUT THERE WAS No PEACE: THE
ROLE OF VIOLENCE IN THE POLITICS OF RECONSTRUCTION (1984).
21. E.g.,
THE
FREEDMEN'S
BUREAU
AND
RECONSTRUCTION:
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Less frequently investigated has been the struggle that
occurred over the founding of the Bureau. It is unsurprising that
this new federal agency, given a broad mandate to remedy some of
the evils of slavery, aroused opposition among border state
politicians, former slave owners, and other defenders of the status
quo. More surprising are the concerns raised even by some of its
supporters in Congress, concerns over not only the practical
nature of its operation but, importantly, the constitutional bases
on which it rested.
Such concerns were inevitable considering the nature of the
Freedmen's Bureau. Put simply, the Bureau was designed to
operate in a wholly new frontier of American law. For the first
time, the federal government would operate directly in the
personal lives of a large body of citizens: it would review private
contracts, settle labor and property disputes, operate schools, and
even serve as a licenser of marriages. These activities were
virtually, if not entirely, unknown before - and some of them since
- within what the Framers had called the general government.
This Article will examine the arguments in Congress over
that extension of federal power. It will review the arguments of
opponents and supporters as to the appropriateness of the Bureau
within the framework of the constitutional system. It will attempt
to derive some constitutional principles from that debate which
may be of value for the future as we continue our endless dialogue
about the nature of the federal system.
One caveat must be noted before beginning a brief survey of
the history of the Bureau. This Article will deliberately avoid a
cynical approach to the operation of the political branches of
government. It might be said of the Freedmen's Bureau - and
indeed, it was sometimes said during the debates - that the acts of
the Reconstruction-era Congresses represented no constitutional
The Radical Republicans had a sufficient
thinking at all.
numerical majority not only to enact legislation but also to brush
aside presidential vetoes. Their work may have been an exercise
of raw political power rather than principled constitutional
22
interpretation.

RECONSIDERATIONS (Paul A. Cimbala & Randall M. Miller eds.,

1999)

[hereinafter RECONSIDERATIONS].

22.

Indeed, some Radical Republicans made this argument themselves.
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Yet it is possible to take seriously the actions of the
Republicans. All had sworn an oath to the Constitution, and it is
not unreasonable to take historical figures at their word in such
matters, at least until evidence shows otherwise. During the
debates, they consistently declared a real interest in and devotion
to the Constitution. Indeed, at least one Republican soon to be
elected to the House of Representatives spent much time in 1860
re-reading The Federalist Papers, as well as the thoughts of
Edmund Burke on the nature of revolution. 23 As will be seen, the
Republicans made arguments for the Bureau both on
constitutional and policy grounds. As they appeared to take their
duties seriously, so we should take their actions seriously.
II. THE NEED FOR A FREEDMEN'S BUREAU
A. "Contrabands"
In some ways, it was the actions of the South that made the
Civil War a contest over slavery. From the secession of South
Carolina upon the election of the "Black Republican" Abraham
Lincoln through the Confederate pronouncements about the
terrible fate awaiting Union soldiers who fought with black
troops, 24 the paranoia about slavery among the masters helped

Consider, for example, the remarks as that of Thaddeus Stevens concerning
the admission of West Virginia:
[Wie may admit West Virginia as a new state, not by virtue of any
provision of the Constitution, but under an absolute power which the
laws of war give us. I shall vote for this bill upon that theory; for I
will not stultify myself by supposing that we have any warrant in
the Constitution for this proceeding.
A Traitor Congress and a Traitor President,2 THE OLD GUARD, Jan. 1863, at
13, available at http://cdl.library.cornell.edu/moa/moa-browse.html) (original
emphasis removed). Such comments are not typical of the majority of the
Republicans, who seemed to have been more solemn about the Constitution.
23.

MARTIN RIDGE, IGNATIUS DONNELLY: THE PORTRAIT OF A POLITICIAN 48

(1963).
24. In his engaging description of his travels through the Confederacy,
Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Fremantle of the Coldstream Guards reported
this chilling anecdote: "News arrived this evening of the capture of Helena by
the Confederates, and of the hanging of a Negro regiment with forty Yankee
officers. Every one expressed sorrow for the blacks, but applauded the
destruction

of their

officers."

ARTHUR JAMEs

LYON

FREMANTLE,

THE

FREMANTLE DIARY 116 (Walter Lord ed., 1954) (1863). Fremantle discovered
later that the mass execution had not, in fact, occurred. Id.

2006]

CONSTITUTIONAL IMAGINATION

convince their slaves that the war was one for freedom. It is
unsurprising, then, that from early in the war escaping slaves ran
25
to the Union Army as a deliverer.
Desperate to keep the United States intact and especially to
maintain the allegiance of the Border States, President Lincoln's
military devised a series of reactions that was both confused and
In the early days of the war, fiercely
counterproductive.
Republican Union General John C. Fremont summarily
emancipated every slave of a Confederate in Missouri, a policy so
far ahead of the White House that Lincoln encouraged him to
rescind it.26 The subsequent official policy of noninterference with
slavery was itself resented by many commanders. Oliver 0.
Howard, who was to rise to Corps Command and later become the
Commissioner of the Freedmen's Bureau, described a scene in
1861 in occupied Virginia when a slave made her way to his
When her owner arrived shortly
brigade headquarters. 2 7
thereafter, he bitterly agreed to return the women and her child to
her mistress, but refused to provide an army escort, which meant
28
that the slave immediately re-escaped.
It was General Benjamin Butler, a decidedly unorthodox
political general from Massachusetts, who ultimately provided the
resolution of the status of escaped slaves. Although neither an
early advocate of abolition nor a particularly able military officer,
It was he who,
Butler's legal analysis proved irresistible.
accepting the South's definition of slaves as property, argued that
any property used by the enemy in perpetuation of the war could
'29
legitimately be seized by a belligerent as "contraband of war.
His refusal to return slaves to slave owners was thus
simultaneously radical and conservative. This characterization
was wholly unsurprising as applied to horses or guns; that it had
never been used by the American military to refer to humans did
not detract from its apt fit with the problem at hand. As more and

25. FONER, supranote 20, at 3.
26. JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY-OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA
352-53 (1988).
27. 2 OLIVER 0. HOWARD, AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF OLIVER OTIS HOWARD 165-66
(1907).
28. Id.
29. HERMAN HATTAWAY AND ARCHER JONES, HOW THE NORTH WON: A
MILITARY HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR 34 (1983).
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more of these "contrabands" flocked to Butler's command at
Fortress Monroe, Virginia, other commanders began to imitate the
30
Butler experiment.
B. Emancipation
During the war, the President's ideas about slavery evolved
from his attempted noninterference of his First Inaugural Address
in 1861,31 to his sweeping condemnation of it in his Second
Inaugural Address in the month before his death. 32 But in 1862
his decision to order a presidential emancipation was far less a
moral decision than one designed to weaken the Confederacy
militarily and cripple it diplomatically. When, after the battle of
Antietam, he proclaimed that anyone enslaved in territory still in
rebellion on January 1, 1863, would be "forever free, '33 he asserted
34
a constitutional power hitherto unseen in American history.
After the proclamation, the stream of escaping slaves coming
to the army became a flood. General Sherman, on his march
through Georgia, described black men and women fleeing to him
35
and mixing his name up with those of Moses and the president.
Sherman's problem in dealing with this wave of humanity
colliding with his army was repeated in other theaters with other
commanders: what was to be done with the "contrabands"?
General Butler's classification had perfectly resolved the issue
created by a few able-bodied escaped slaves; it was entirely
inadequate for the "human cloud that clung like remorse on the

30. FONER, supra note 20, at 5.
31. "I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the
institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I believe I have no lawful
right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so." THE PORTABLE ABRAHAM
LINCOLN 195 (Andrew Delbanco ed., 1992).
32. If we shall suppose that American Slavery is one of those offences
which, in the providence of God, must needs come, but which, having
continued through His appointed time, He now wills to remove, and
that He gives to both North and South, this terrible war, as the woe
due to those by whom the offence came, shall we discern therein any
departure from those divine attributes which the believers in a Living
God always ascribe to Him?
Id. at 321.
33. Id. at 271; 1 SHELBY FOOTE, THE CIVIL WAR: A NARRATIVE 704 (1958).
34. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2723 (1866).
35. FONER, supra note 20, at 70.
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rear of those swift columns.

'36

III. EARLY IDEAS
In the absence of a clear political answer to that question,
regional military authorities became laboratories of different ideas
about how to solve the crises of homeless and hungry refugees who
began to clog their supply lines. The officers involved varied in
both their ability and their political viewpoints; it is unsurprising,
then, that their solutions represented a wide range of possibilities.
Further complicating the issue, the Treasury Department was
also involved, as Congress had given that department ultimate
responsibility for abandoned lands that had fallen into the custody
37
of the Army.
The coastal islands off the coast of the Carolinas became an
early and odd exemplar of possibilities for the future.
The
combined efforts of the United States Navy and a small Army
force led by General Thomas W. Sherman liberated the islands
from Confederate control in 1861.38 By the time the Army took
control, the white plantation owners had completely fled. 39 Into
this "Port Royal experiment" came the Treasury agents now
responsible for the land, Army officers responsible for law and
order, and abolitionists and educators sent by benevolent
associations of the North to help order a new and slavery-free
society. 40 Government representatives paid for the work of the
former slaves and began teaching self-government. 4 1 The Sea
Islands experience was undoubtedly paternalistic, but was
genuinely directed at improvement of the condition of the
42
freedmen, and their integration into meaningful citizenship.

36. W.E.B. DuBois, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 48 (Bedford Books 1997)
(1903).
37. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2799 (1864) (statement of Sen.
Sumner). This arrangement may have been based on a personal relationship:
Sumner's greatest friend in the Administration was Treasury Secretary
Salmon P. Chase, who he had once called "a tower of strength," for his work
in the anti-slavery movement. See DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, TEAM OF RIVALS
146 (2005).
38. BENTLEY, supra note 19, at 5.

39. Id. at 6.
40. Id. at 12.
41. Id. at 10.
42.

Id.; FONER, supra note 20, at 51-54.
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Arguably even more responsive to the future of the freedmen
was the "negro paradise" of Davis Bend. 43 This area of Mississippi
River property was built on the landholdings of Jefferson Davis
and his family. 44

General U.S. Grant ordered the Confederate

President's land set aside for the sole settlement of freedmen. 4 5
Under the supervision of his Chaplain, John Eaton, freedmen's
46
councils were organized and empowered to decide local issues.
More committed to laissez faire than the Port Royal Experiment,
the lack of paternalism in Mississippi showed both a trust that the
freedmen could stand on their own feet, and a desire to be rid
quickly of the duties inherent in reconstruction of the slave
47
states.
Yet a third model appeared in Louisiana upriver of New
Orleans. Under the command first of Benjamin Butler, and later
of Nathaniel Banks, a troubling replication of slavery began to
take shape. Faced with a huge number of escaping slaves, and
seeking to maintain the wealth-producing plantations of the area,
these generals proved themselves much more interested in order
than liberty. Butler went so far initially as to turn away any
fugitives who could not be employed by the Army. 48 Sadly,
Louisiana's large and sophisticated free black community, the
Creole population of New Orleans, did not initially object to this
treatment of the freedmen. Some observers noted the tragic way
in which this literate, Francophone group rejected commonality
with the slaves of rural Louisiana. 4 9 Whether because of lack of
opposition from Louisiana Unionists, or racism, venality, or mere
shortsightedness of those implementing the system, the state
experienced the introduction of a system that abolitionists
criticized as a new form of slavery. Before the introduction of the
Freedmen's Bureau, Louisiana saw military enforcement of
mandatory annual labor contracts, the return of supervision by
overseers, and prosecution for vagrancy of freedmen who dared to

43.

FONER, supra note 20, at 59.
44. Id. at 58.
45. Id. at 59.
46. Id.
47. See id. at 58-60.
48. Caryn Cosse Bell, "Une Chimere" The Freedmen's Bureau in Creole
New Orleans, in RECONSIDERATIONS, supra note 21, at 140, 143.
49. FONER, supra note 20, at 47-48.
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leave their plantations. 50 Ironically, the codification of such ideas
in the "black codes" after the war provided a major incentive for
the expansion of the Freedmen's Bureau, the first Civil Rights
Act, and ultimately the Fourteenth Amendment.
Chaos resulted from these differing systems. Benevolent
societies faced real difficulties in accommodating the different
requirements of theater commanders, and the nation developed a
growing awareness that military half-measures and charitable
contributions simply could not resolve the problems inherent in
mass emancipation. 5 1 The President and Congress began to
receive petitions calling for a federal solution to what was
obviously a federal problem. 52 When the War Department stood
up the American Freedmen's Inquiry Commission to study the
problem in 1863, they came to the same conclusion. 53 The
commission
sought a national response,
a Bureau
of
Emancipation, which would protect the freedmen, but would be a
temporary measure and not a permanent agency of the
54
government.
IV. THE FIRST FREEDMEN'S BUREAU STATUTE AND ITS PROBLEMS

The course of Congress's solution to the problem was a
tortuous but instructive one. Over the life of the Bureau of
Abandoned Lands, Refugees, and Freedmen, the legislative
history is a kaleidoscope of idea and counter-idea, challenge and
response. This reflects the multifaceted nature of the problems
facing the freedmen, the limited means for solving the difficulties,
and the disparate goals of the interested parties.
Starving freedmen needed food, of course. Refugee camps
needed medicine and doctors.
More than that, though, the
freedmen wanted the things they had ever been denied as slaves:
their own land, the liberty to travel, the right to marry, the
independence not to have to grovel when in the presence of whites.
Their desires, expressed to Congress by representatives of
benevolent societies and other advocates, were for land, for
50.

Bell, supra note 48, at 144.

51. HOWARD, supra note 27, at 197.
52. Id.; CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 571-72 (1864) (letter from the
Freedmen's Societies of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Cincinnati).
53. FONER, supra note 20, at 68.
54. Id. at 68-69.
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55
education, for civil protection.
The Army, on the other hand, wanted more than anything to
be released from the refugee problem. Particularly during the
major offensives of 1864, army commanders saw the waves of
freedmen as impairments on their transportation resources and
drains on their logistical supplies. Through the intermediary of
the Freedmen's Inquiry Commission, general officers were able to
communicate their frustration to Congress. 56
Particularly
disturbing to them, it seems, was the fact that different
departments had responsibility for the freedmen and the lands on
57
which they worked.
Congress's first attempt to respond came from the pen of
Representative Thomas Eliot of Massachusetts. The chairman of
the Committee on Emancipation, Eliot's first bill was a relatively
brief and simple tool. It authorized an agency in the War
Department, headed by a Presidentially-appointed commissioner,
staffed by army officers, and empowered to make all the rules
necessary for the "general superintendence" of slaves freed by
military or government action. 58 The Senate responded by
passing a substitute bill, one which stood up an agency in the
Treasury Department with a much more detailed list of
59
responsibilities.
The first attempt at compromise created by a joint committee
established a wholly independent department of the government,
answerable to neither War nor Treasury. After narrow passage in
the House, the compromise failed in the Senate. Representative
Eliot continued to struggle, and after a second joint committee
hammered out another compromise, his bill passed. 60 This first
Freedmen's Bureau law provided for an agency in the War
Department with authority to provide food and shelter for
immediate relief of both freedmen and white refugees of the war.6 1

55.

HOWARD, supra note 27, at 197-98; BENTLEY, supra note 19, at 30.

56.

See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2800 (1864).

57. Id.
58. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 573 (1864) (statement of Rep.
Eliot).
59. Id. at 2798. The Senate bill was largely the work of Charles Sumner,
see supra note 37.
60. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 513 (1866).
61. An Act to Establish a Bureau for the Relief of Freedmen and
Refugees, ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507 (1865).
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It also gave the Commissioner and his assistants the power to
divide land, both abandoned and confiscated, into lots for rental to
the freedmen. 62 After three years, the tenants could then buy the
land from the government. 63 The Bureau was to last throughout
the rebellion, and for one year past it.64
V. THE

STATUTE, THE PROBLEMS, AND GENERAL HOWARD

This statute was rather vague, even for a time of less-specific
legislation than is customary today. In part because of Eliot's
desperate hurry to accomplish something and in part because the
proponents were not in complete accord about what they wanted,
the statute was deliberately blank in several areas. It would be
65
left to the Bureau to attempt to fill in the blanks itself.
From
the beginning, the Bureau's first and only
Commissioner attempted to do just that. General Oliver Otis
Howard, appointed by President Johnson shortly after the
assassination of Abraham Lincoln, was known to have been the
late president's choice for the job. 66 Not an abolitionist before the
war, Howard had instead expressed real sympathy for Southern
whites. 67 Nevertheless, during the war he became a strong
proponent of the need of the Army to care for the freedmen.
Although it could be argued that his work as a corps commander
69
68
was less than superb at both Chancellorsville and Gettysburg,
62.
63.

Id.
Id.

64.

Id.

65. BENTLEY, supra note 19, at 49.
66. Hans L. Trefousse, Andrew Johnson and the Freedmen's Bureau, in
RECONSIDERATIONS, supra note 21, at 29-30.
67. BENTLEY, supra note 19, at 54.

68. Howard's XI Corps held the right of the Army of the Potomac's line
once General Joseph Hooker moved them south of the Rappahannock River.
His failure to link his own right to the river, or refuse it toward the Army's
center meant that it was "in the air," as discovered by Confederate
cavalryman J.E.B. Stuart. This poor positioning was the incentive for
General Stonewall Jackson's extraordinarily risky withdrawal from the front
of the Union Army and trek through narrow forested paths to the right of the
Union line. When Jackson's corps disgorged from the woods upon Howard's
unguarded flank, they quickly routed the Federal troops and caused the
collapse of the Union right. Howard's fearlessness in attempting to rally his
troops in their flight probably prevented his removal from command. See
EDWARD J. STACKPOLE, CHANCELLORSVILLE: LEE'S GREATEST BATTLE 220-44 (2d

ed. 1988) (1958).
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his personal bravery and physical endurance were beyond
reproach. His loss of an arm on the battlefield of Fair Oaks,
coupled with his very public display of his Christianity, 70 placed
him above the criticism of his potential foes. Indeed, throughout
the course of the extremely bitter congressional debates over the
Freedmen's Bureau, complaints directed to the character of the
Commissioner himself were relatively rare.
The assistant commissioners he assembled were a mix of
ideologies and abilities, combat leaders, judge advocates and
chaplains, and even the son of a Supreme Court Justice. 7 1 These
men, and the agents they supervised, would make the daily
decisions of the Freedmen's Bureau, subject only to the guidance
and direction from Howard which primarily arrived in the form of
Circulars.
They would review labor contracts, help establish
schools, lease land under their control, and generally assist the
newly freed slaves in the pursuit of citizenship. 72 They were never
large in number, considering their responsibilities, and faced

69. As at Chancellorsville, Howard allowed a flank to be exposed.
Coming to the rescue of John Reynolds's embattled First Corps on the first
day of the battle, his divisions clashed with the hard-driven forces of Jubal
Early. Unfortunately for Howard, his lead division, under the command of
Francis Barlow, extended considerably north of Carl Schurz's division on his
left. When that undefended flank crumbled under the relentless drive of
John Gordon's Brigade of Early's Division, the entire Corps withdrew.
Because they were not routed as they had been two months earlier, and
because Howard's Corps included many German-Americans (viewed with
suspicion by many of their nativist comrades), he was once again preserved in
his command. See RICHARD WHEELER, GETTYSBURG 1863: CAMPAIGN OF
ENDLESS ECHOES 177-85 (1999). It is possible that President Lincoln, ever a
student of military operations and the capabilities of his generals, suggested
Howard for the Freedmen's Bureau in part because he did not think that he
would be much missed on the battlefield.
70. Id. at 177-78.
71. BENTLEY, supra note 19, at 58-61.
72. The assistant commissioners and agents showed both flexibility and
originality in accomplishing their vaguely defined missions. They followed no
uniform procedure, but frequently adopted ideas which had proved successful
in other areas. The dispute resolution model created by Colonel Orlando
Brown for Virginia, for example, gained very wide currency throughout the
Bureau. Where landowners and tenants argued over the nature of the lease
or labor contract, Brown allowed each to choose one judge for a three-member
tribunal, with a Bureau agent serving as the third. The tribunal was to
follow Virginia law, except where that law discriminated on racial grounds.
See DONALD G. NIEMAN, To SET THE LAW IN MOTION: THE FREEDMEN'S BUREAU
AND THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF BLACKS, 1865-1868, at 10 (1979).
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extreme social hostility as well as violence and the threat of
73
violence that drove many from their duties prematurely.
Battlefield hostilities ceased within the earliest days of the
life of the Bureau. This raised the complicated problem of what
the Bureau's authority would be and how soon the civil
governments of the South would return to power. This latter
dispute, which became the source of the bitter contest over
Presidential versus Congressional Reconstruction, would prove
the most intractable of problems for the Bureau throughout its
life. Indeed, Andrew Johnson's personal ambivalence toward the
Bureau would prove a major hurdle for its activities. On the one
hand, President Johnson was eager to use the threat of Bureau
involvement to gain the concessions from Southern states he
hoped to readmit under Presidential Reconstruction. 74 On the
other, he frequently expressed disapproval of the Bureau's
75
activities, especially in the area of education.
Always pulled between those seeking better enforcement of
federal law and those desiring return of the pre-war status quo,
the Bureau became the target of critics on both sides. As state
legislatures enacted new black codes and local officials attempted
to enforce old slave regulations, Bureau agents recognized that
legal protection of their charges, although not explicitly provided
for in the original statute, was a vital component in the
improvement of the freedmen. Further, returning Confederates
and other Southern whites sought to use the legal system to
obstruct the Bureau's efforts; many suits were filed in state courts
alleging the commission of civil wrongs by Bureau agents and
other federal officers. 76 By the time the pivotal thirty-ninth
Congress convened, Howard noted to Senator Lyman Trumbull
the desperate need for new legislation, observing that the
President had himself "drifted into positive opposition to the
77
Bureau law."

73. Randall M. Miller, The Freedmen's Bureau and Reconstruction: An
Overview, in RECONSIDERATIONS, supra note 21, at xiii, xxix-xxx.
74. See NIEMAN, supra note 72, at 7.
75. HOWARD, supra note 27, at 273.
76. HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER
LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 1835-1875, at 322 (1982).
77. HOWARD, supra note 27, at 280.
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VI. THE SECOND STATUTE

A. The Debate and the Bill
Thus Congress set to the task of enlarging and stabilizing the
Bureau. Senator Trumbull, a Republican from Illinois, sought to
create a law that would be both radical enough to expand the
powers of the Bureau to deal with the problems of Reconstruction,
and conservative enough to win the support of the President. His
bill declined to set a date for the expiration of the Bureau; it would
be continued instead "until otherwise provided by law.

78s

In

keeping with the standard expectations of its supporters, Senator
Trumbull assured his colleagues that the Bureau was "not
intended as a permanent institution. ' 79 Possibly worse, from the
perspective of its opponents, Trumbull's bill expanded the Bureau
spatially as well, taking in "all parts of the United States,"80 a
phrase seemingly designed to capture Kentucky's enforcement of
its old slave code against newly freed blacks. 8 1 In response to
Howard's concerns regarding the injustice perpetrated against
freedman and agent alike, the bill specifically granted the Bureau
the authority to extend military jurisdiction over any freedmen
when they were denied the same civil rights or immunities as
white persons.8 2 It also extended military jurisdiction over all of
the Bureau's agents and employees. 83
The battles over the bill, discussed in detail below, raged with
a severity that exceeded those of the previous Congress. They
were intimately tied to the debates over Trumbull's other
measure, the Civil Rights Act.8 4 They included sharp differences
over the meaning of the Constitution as well as soaring hymns to
equality and blasts of racial hatred. After extensive legislative
struggles in both chambers, majorities were assembled and the
78.
79.
80.

CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 316 (1866).
Id. at 319.
Id. at 316.

81. See infra notes 213-215 and accompanying text.
82. An Act to continue in force and to amend "An Act to Establish a
Bureau for the Relief of Freedmen and Refugees,' and for other Purposes," ch.
200, 14 Stat. 173 (1866).

83. These provisions remained the same in the bill that passed over the
President's veto in July 1866. See id.
84. HYMAN & WIECEK, supranote .76, at 413.
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bill passed in February 1866. The bitterness did not cease,
though, with the passage of the expansion bill. Immediately
following the vote in the Senate, Kentucky's Garret Davis rose to
amend the title to:
[A] bill to appropriate a portion of the public land in some
of the southern States and to authorize the United States
Government to purchase lands to supply farms and build
houses upon them for the freed negroes; to promote strife
and conflict between the white and black races; and to
invest the Freedmen's Bureau with unconstitutional
powers to aid and assist the blacks, and to introduce
military power to prevent the Commissioner and other
officers of said bureau from being restrained or held
responsible in civil courts for their illegal acts in
rendering such aid and assistance to the blacks; and for
85
other purposes.
B. Johnson's Veto
To the astonishment of Senator Trumbull, and to the outrage
of the Republicans, Andrew Johnson vetoed the Freedmen's
Bureau expansion bill. His veto message, delivered to Congress
on February 19, 1866, combined constitutional theory and overt
foot-dragging. It did not end the legislative war over the Bureau,
but its arguments did locate the battlefield for much of the future
debate.

The veto - the first of Johnson's presidency

86

- raised

many of the arguments that had previously been urged in
Congress, and some that had not. The president claimed that the
bill was not necessary, as the original bill had not yet expired;
that the military tribunals it called for were arbitrary and
unconstitutional; that although the initial law was a proper act of
war, "the rebellion is in fact at an end"; and that nothing in the
87
condition of the country justified the expansion of the Bureau.
Johnson further argued that the Constitution never contemplated
a system of support for the poor, that the Bureau's cost under the
new bill could exceed the cost of the entire federal government
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 421 (1866).
LaWanda Cox, Andrew Johnson and His Ghost Writers, in FREEDOM,
RACISM, AND RECONSTRUCTION 76, 76 (Donald G. Nieman ed., 1997).
87. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 916 (1866).
85.
86.

CONG. GLOBE,
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under John Quincy Adams, and that the Takings Clause was
violated by the bill's land provisions.8 8 He claimed that freedmen
were perfectly able to take care of themselves, that post-war labor
shortages ensured that the States would seek only their well
being. 89 In a final argument that had not been heard before, but
would be voiced again by opponents of Congressional
Reconstruction, he argued that congressional action absent
representation of the Southern states was unconstitutional. 90
Johnson even claimed that although Congressmen represented
only the constituents of their States, as President he represented
all Americans. 9 1 It was his duty, then, to "present their just
claims."

92

Although the veto message was far ranging and vigorous, it is
Noted
noteworthy that it might have been even stronger.
historian LaWanda

Cox has written

that one of the drafts

proposed by an unidentified advisor to the President included an
unequivocal denial of national authority in any matter of "natural
'93
rights, civil rights, race relations, education, and relief.
Whether because he did not subscribe to language this sweeping,
or whether he simply felt it unnecessary, Andrew Johnson did not
Nonetheless, the ferocity of the veto put the
include it.
congressional Republicans on notice that the President was now
Johnson confirmed this idea by his speech
an overt foe.
commemorating Washington's birthday three days later in which
he characterized the Republican leadership as "opposed to the
Union" and "opposed to the fundamental principles of this
Government and . . . laboring to destroy them. '94 The political
88. Id.
89. Id. at 917.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. The last argument was repeated by opponents of the Bureau and
other Reconstruction measures thereafter, but Senator Trumbull effectively
pointed out its logical inconsistency. "If that objection be valid," he observed,
"all our legislation affecting those States is wrong, and has been wrong from
the beginning." Id. at 942. Indeed, there is no logical reason to treat
Reconstruction legislation differently from any other, and this argument
should have required the veto of all enactments passed without Southern
representation. Trumbull also wondered aloud how many votes Andrew
Johnson had received in the Southern States.
93. Cox, supra note 86, at 80.
94.

RECONSTRUCTION, THE NEGRO, AND THE NEW SOUTH 56 (LaWanda Cox
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war thus begun would extend through the veto of the Civil Rights
Act, the passage of a new Freedmen's Bureau expansion bill over
his veto, Johnson's public rage before supporters in his tactically
disastrous "swing around the circle," 95 and ultimately the
impeachment and trial of the President.
VII. THE ARGUMENTS

The battles over the Freedmen's Bureau simply never ceased
during its lifetime. Like the Army of Northern Virginia from 1864
on, the opponents of the Bureau attempted to block and obstruct
and delay and fall back; unlike Lee's Army, they were defeated but
they never surrendered. A review of the arguments made in
Congress during the initial bill, and the various subsequent
legislation, reads like a legal version of a complex musical work:
themes begin and rise and intertwine, part and are quiet for a
time, then reappear suddenly, and in unexpected ways. Because
of this progression of arguments in time, the debates over the
rather than
thematically,
Bureau will be considered
chronologically. Attention will be given, where appropriate, to
particular legislative situations affecting individual voices in the
struggle.
A. A Doctrine of EnumeratedPowers
The argument that the power of the national government
relates "to certain enumerated objects only," leaving the States "a
residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects"'96 has
always been fundamental to the American understanding of the
Constitutional system. It is unsurprising that this principle
confronted a Bureau whose chief later wrote that "legislative,
judicial, and executive powers were combined in my
commission."

97

Many of the opponents of the Bureau took the position that
the entire operation was prohibited because it was not expressly
& John H. Cox eds., 1973). When the crowd demanded the naming of names,
Johnson compared Stevens, Sumner, and Phillips to the Confederacy's Davis,
Toombs, and Slidell as foes of the United States. Id.
95. FONER, supra note 20, at 264-65.
96. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 245 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
97. HOWARD, supra note 27, at 362-63.
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authorized in the plain language of the founding document. Some
pointed out precisely the combination of powers that General
Howard had referred to; the phrase imperium in imperio appears
more than once in these complaints regarding the nature of the
organization. 98 They objected to what they characterized as the
creation of a second government, without the authorization of the
Constitution, which would operate only over "a particular class."9 9
Others gave lengthy explanations of their view of the proper
roles of the different spheres of the federal and state governments.

Repeatedly members of Congress argued that the Freedmen's
Bureau was a creation of a "consolidated Government" which
would violate the agreement of the "compact of the States."'0 0 One

senator grew vitriolic enough to claim that the bill called up "the
blood of a murdered Constitution,"' 0'o

while another, not yet

convinced of demise of the founding document, sought to save it by
proclaiming death to all of the Constitution's enemies "whether in
102
the form of Jeff. Davis or Abraham Lincoln."
The argument also frequently invoked the explosive term
"State's Rights." Members of Congress referred to this principle that the states were sovereign - as the basis of the entire
constitutional system,1 03 as the main pillar upon which our

national fabric rests, 104 and as the "essential virtue" of the
Constitution. 105 One senator even referred to the United States
upon its founding as "a confederation of equal states. 106

Coupled with these expansive statements of general principle,
opponents of the Bureau simultaneously raised objections to

98. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 334 (1866) (statement of Sen.
Cowan); Id. at 626 (statement of Rep. Kerr). Indeed, even W.E.B. DuBois
called the Bureau "the new government - for a government it really was."
DuBois, supra note 36, at 51.
99. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 3346 (1864) (statement of Sen.
Hendricks).
100. Id. at 799 (statement of Rep. Dawson).
101. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2969 (1864) (statement of Sen.
Saulsbury).
102. Id. at 3344 (statement of Sen. Davis).
103. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 891 (1865) (statement of Rep.
Pendleton).
104. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 639 (1866) (statement of Rep.
Shanklin).
105. Id. at 342 (statement of Sen. Cowan).
106. Id. at 368 (statement of Sen. Hendricks).
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specific features of the bills as going beyond the legislative power
of Congress. In the early days of the struggle, these complaints
Some
tended to be focused on the relief efforts themselves.
argued, for example, that the federal government simply had no
role to play in philanthropy. 107 They frequently insisted that only
private charities could perform such work; one representative
importuned the "honey-tongued humanitarians of New England"
to "go into the camps of the contrabands . . .and lift them out of
the mire."1 08 Others argued that the Southern States, no less
concerned with the well-being of the freedmen than any other part
of their population, were the best able to provide any necessary
Still others seemed to accept this power of the
relief. 109
government only if it were applied universally, one representative
denouncing a plan to care for one racial group of people, but not
widows and orphans generally. 110 Senator Johnson warned that if
Congress could act on philanthropic principles in this case, then
there was no limit at all on its potential authority.I1 I
A slight variation on this argument dealt with funding: some
members of Congress argued that the cost was simply too great to
be countenanced within a government of limited powers.
Representative Kalbfleisch linked this fiscal argument to an
ideological one by claiming that the original bill, in not limiting
the spending of the Bureau, endowed this "experiment" with
"power more despotic than the imperial Government of Russia.", 1 2
He was immediately followed by his colleague and fellow New
Yorker James Brooks, who termed the proposed Bureau vast,
described it as having unforeseeable funding requirements, and
added Imperial Rome to Russia as fitting comparisons to the
1 13
tyranny wrought by "the spirit of Massachusetts."

107. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 709 (1864); CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 628 (1866) (statement of Rep. Marshall).
108. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 709 (1864) (statement of Rep.
Cox, who called the plan to help the freedmen "sweeping and revolutionary,"
and maintained that if adopted "our whole system of government is
changed"). See also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 628 (1866) (statement
of Rep. Marshall).
109. Id. at 335 (statement of Sen. Guthrie).
110. Id. at 2780 (statement of Rep. Le Blond).
111. Id. at 372.
112. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 760 (1864).
113. Id. at 761.
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As time went by and the activities of the Freedmen's Bureau
multiplied, the educational efforts became an increasingly
targeted feature of this limited power argument. The government
was called devoid of the right to be a school builder or teacher.14
This role, too, was said to be an infringement on the rights of the
states, and they were alleged to be the responsible guardians of
the education of their citizens. 115
B. The JudicialPower
After the broad attack on it as beyond the power of the federal
government, the second most frequently heard arguments in
Congress concerned the power of the Bureau to act judicially.
Howard noted that one of the most important works his agents
faced was "obtaining recognition of the negro as a man instead of a
chattel before the civil and criminal courts" of the South."16 Even
under the guidance of the first statute, which did not specifically
authorize a judicial role, the Freedmen's Bureau in some states
began serving as courts for minor cases. 117 In others the Bureau
attempted less direct solutions: in Alabama, for example, assistant
commissioner General Wager Swayne allowed state judges to
serve as Bureau agents providing they agreed to grant equal
rights to the freedmen. 118
That the Bureau would have to assert military jurisdiction to
fulfill its mandate was clearly foreseen by its opponents. Of
course, during the war, military tribunals were convened under
martial law in the recaptured South, and even, in occasional illadvised cases, in Northern States. 119 Senator Willard Saulsbury,
Sr., the fiery Delawaran who proudly declared himself "one of the
last slaveholders in America,"' 2 0 went so far as to propose an
amendment to the 1864 bill which would exempt "all white
persons in the states not in revolt" from the potential jurisdiction
21
of military commissions. 1
114. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 648 (1866) (statement of Rep.
Trimble).
115. Id. at 370 (statement of Sen. Davis).
116. HOWARD, supra note 27, at 251.
117.
118.

See supra note 72.
NIEMAN, supra note 72, at 17.

119.
120.

See Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 321 (1866).

121.

CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2933 (1864).
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As local courts began harassing agents, and as states
attempted to impose and enforce black codes, Congress concluded
that it needed to grant the Bureau specific authorization to
exercise judicial powers. This decision enraged the Bureau's
opponents. Some saw sinister purposes in the use of military
commissions, one senator claiming that such tribunals were
intended to create a despotic government for the advancement of
blacks over whites. 12 2 Most, however, simply focused on the
system itself, decrying the inevitable loss of liberty when ordinary
citizens were made subject to military tribunals. 123 The lack of a
jury in military proceedings was a central concern, 124 but one
senator expanded his criticism to call military justice "the highest
terror that can be addressed to the mind of man in this
country."'125 Even those who were somewhat more subdued feared
the establishment of extraordinary courts not subject to the
26
limitations of the Constitution. 1
Interestingly, the assertion of military jurisdiction over
agents of the Bureau also raised constitutional objections. The
grant of jurisdiction over Bureau members was clearly designed to
remove agents from the threat of hostile local legal systems.
Because most of the Bureau agents were military officers, they
were already subject to trial by court-martial for alleged
wrongdoing. This jurisdiction, then, was a very minor expansion
in terms of actual judicial power over agent malfeasance.
Because of its symbolic value, however, this provision also
became the subject of attack. There can be little doubt that the
Bureau's opponents realized that the announcement by Congress
of military jurisdiction over these men was an announcement of
their immunity from harassment by the states. They therefore
vehemently argued that this provision was flatly unconstitutional.
Several senators pointed angrily to the Fifth Amendment and
122. Id. at 2803 (statement of Sen. Richardson).
123. Id. at 3328 (statement of Sen. Davis); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 346 (1866) (statement of Sen. Davis).
124. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 786 (1865) (statement of Sen.
Davis); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 416 (1866) (statement of Sen.
Davis).
125. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 3347 (1864) (statement of Sen.
Hendricks).
126. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 566 (1865) (statement of Rep.
Kernan).
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argued that the plain language of the Constitution forbade the
trial of anyone not currently in the military without the safeguard
of the jury, unknown to military tribunals. 127 One Senator
pronounced the ominous threat that if Congress could deem
members of the Freedmen's Bureau in the military for
jurisdictional purposes, they could do the same to members of
12 8
Congress or the judiciary or the executive branch.
Congress maintained the jurisdiction provision in the bill, and
it ultimately passed over the President's veto. Although it never
129
received the scrutiny of the federal courts, the Milligan case
and the controversy over Dr. James Watson 130 cast over Bureau
courts an aura of illegitimacy. This vague sense of unease later
transformed into the source of great libel, as in one history of the
Bureau, which blamed the "anomalous judicial system" and its
execution by "narrow, misguided, unprincipled, or partisan bureau
agents" for "the negro's air of insolence," the growth of the Ku
1 31
Klux Klan, and the "gulf... between black and white."

127. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 3327 (1864) (statement of Sen.
Hendricks); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 984 (1865) (statement of Sen.
Hale); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 987 (1865) (statement of Sen.
Conness).
128. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 990 (1865) (statement of Sen.
Johnson).
129. In rejecting an Indiana trial by military commission of a Copperhead,
Milligan held that martial law could not exist outside of the actual theater of
war where courts were unable to function, 71 U.S. 2, 127 (1866). Indeed, the
opinion specifically notes that such courts "could have been enforced in
Virginia, where the national authority was overturned and the courts driven
out." Id. Nonetheless, opponents of the Bureau and Reconstruction generally
argued that Milligan stood for the proposition that military tribunals had no
authority to try civilians.
130. In November 1866, Watson, in cold blood, shot a freedman who he felt
was not properly respectful one day after their two carriages had collided. VI
CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

214 (1971).
When a Virginia magistrate released him, the military
commander directed his trial by military commission, and refused to obey a
state court's writ of habeas corpus. Id. When the Supreme Court released
the Milligan decision a month later, the Richmond newspapers crowed that
the doctor must be freed for, in the words of the Dispatch, "there is not one
inch of ground upon which the commission can base a claim of jurisdiction."
Id. President Johnson ordered Watson's release. Id. at 215.
131. PEIRCE, supra note 19, at 159.
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C. Land
After the role of the Freedmen's Bureau to enforce contractual
and civil rights, the next most contentious area was probably its
role in the land controversy.
Early in the debate, one
representative termed protecting property rights the "great and
paramount object of all Governments."' 132 Echoing the battles over
the Confiscation Acts, Congressmen argued that land
redistribution would imperil the reconciliation sought at the end
of the war. 133 Initially, proponents of the legislation were just as
adamant that land ownership by the freedmen was the only
34
lasting remedy for slavery.1
The initial law had allowed the commissioner to "set apart"
land within the rebelling states that was abandoned or had been
confiscated by the federal government. 135 Such land could be
rented to freedmen at sixty percent of its value for three years. 136
Until the end of the lease the freedman with possession could buy
the land for the appraised price, and would receive in return "such
title thereto as the United States can convey."' 137
This language, of course, left open the question of just what
title the U.S. would be able to convey. If, as some members of
Congress argued, the U.S. possessed the property only under the
law of war as a belligerent power, it did not itself displace the
private ownership of land. 138 Therefore, as soon as the war ended
the property must revert to its original owner and the government
tenant could be evicted.
Further, some pointed to the provision of the Constitution
prohibiting the corruption of blood 139 and claimed that it forbade
"the confiscation of the estate of any guilty of treason beyond the
traitor's life."' 140 To this the Bureau's supporters responded that
132. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 803 (1864) (statement of Rep.
Dawson).
133. Id. at 2969 (statement of Sen. Saulsbury).
134. Id. at 3331 (statement of Sen. Wilson).
135. 13 Stat. 508 (1865).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 619, 625 (1866) (statement of Rep.
Kerr).
139. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2.
140. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 3306 (1864) (statement of Sen.
Carlile).
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the provision in question was inapplicable to wartime, 14 1 and that

it limited only the delegation of power to the courts, and not to the
14 2
federal government as a whole.
It was in this area of land redistribution that President
Johnson most effectively frustrated the will of Congress.

His

grants of amnesty delivered in 1865 restored many members of
the rebel army to their pre-war civil rights. 143 These rights, of
course, included the return of the land that they had held, if not
the slaves who had worked it. 144 This proved to be doubly
effective as a weapon against Reconstruction, as the original plan
for the Freedmen's Bureau involved no appropriation of funds.
This lack of funding represented no attempt to hamstring the
department's efforts. On the contrary, the intent of Congress was
that by renting the lands the federal government then held, the
Bureau would regain its own operating costs plus the costs of
relief supplies for any temporarily imperiled people, black or
white. 145
That the President's liberal policy of forgiving Confederates
undercut the Bureau's efforts is seen in the immediate effects of
the amnesty: within three years of its announcement, the
for
Bureau went from being responsible
Freedmen's
146
total.
that
of
quarter
one
about
to
acres
approximately 850,000
141. Id. (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
142. Id. at 3308 (statement of Sen. Hale).
143. FONER, supra note 20, at 159.
144. Initially, Howard did not think that this was so: in the Bureau's
Circular #13 he announced to his assistants that presidential amnesties did
not inhibit the Bureau's ability to subdivide and lease land to freedmen.
NIEMAN, supra note 72, at 50. When Johnson saw the circular, however, he
summoned Howard to a meeting, made known his objection, and demanded a
revision. When the altered document also displeased him, he had his own
staff prepare a new circular and ordered Howard to issue it. HOWARD, supra
note 27, at 234-35. The new circular required the return of land to any
pardoned rebels unless it had already been legally condemned and sold by a
federal court. Because such proceedings were both rare and slow, and
because most of the sales had not even been completed, the great majority of
the land in the Bureau's hands was no longer designated for the freedmen,
and was shortly returned to its former owners. Id. at 235-36.
145. Indeed, the Senate version of the first bill foresaw a day when the
Bureau would not only be self-supporting but could return excess revenue to
the Treasury. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2798 (1864).
146. BENTLEY, supra note 19, at 102. Bentley notes that much of the
remaining land was of little value, and that many owners deliberately
declined to seek return of their land from the Bureau to avoid tax liability.
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The effect of the loss of this land appears forcefully in the angry
response of Representative Eliot to the President's charge that the
Bureau had been wasteful of the public money: "if it had not been
for the interference of Andrew Johnson, for his persistent and
continual opposition, there would have been in the hands of the
Bureau under the organization of the law creating it an amount of
property which would, without substantially interfering with the
Treasury of the United States, have defrayed nearly the whole of
147
the expenses of the Bureau."
In response to the loss of abandoned lands on which to settle
the freedmen, the Bureau turned to the category of land clearly
amenable for federal title under the law of nations: public land.
For while the rights of a conquered people to retain their private
property has long been respected by at least the commentators on
international law, the right of the victor to the possessions of the
vanquished government has never seriously been questioned. 148
Yet even this feature of the expansion bill in 1866 was
attacked as beyond the scope of the legitimate authority of the
federal government. Indiana's Senator Hendricks argued that the
Confederacy was merely an illegal organization, as the
Constitution did not authorize secession. 14 9 As such a body, its
acts could have no legal force; it could not, therefore, acquire
land. 150 He claimed, astonishingly, that any attempted transfer
from private citizens to the Confederate government was simply a
legal nullity, and such land had to be returned to its prewar
owner. 15 1 Although the confiscation of public lands remained a
feature of both the vetoed 1866 expansion bill and the law enacted
over the following veto, the appearance of this argument on the
floor of the Senate indicates the immense burden faced by
proponents of the Freedmen's Bureau on even seemingly
noncontroversial areas.
D. Reenslavement
An argument made from both sides of the aisle during the
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1814 (1868).
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 625 (1866) (citing HALLECK'S
INTERNATIONAL LAw).
149. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3411 (1866).
147.

148.
150.
151.

Id.
Id.

98

ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

debates focused on the provision

[Vol. 12:70

granting the commissioner

"superintendence" of the freedmen.
Both pro-emancipation
Republicans such as James Grimes of Iowa and slavery apologists
like Waitman Willey of West Virginia claimed that this provision
merely recharacterized slavery from service for a single master to
peonage to the commissioner and a group of agents of mixed
sympathies.

152

Opponents used this provision to argue that the Constitution
authorized no such supervision by the government over such "poor
creatures, 153 and that the men who would become agents should
154
not be trusted with this responsibility regarding other men.
One Senator referred to the Bureau's agents as "broken down
politicians and adventurers, and decayed ministers of the
gospel."'155 Another predicted opposition from the Southern state
governments, desperate to protect their citizens from "these

Bureaucrats, these Negro-catchers."' 156 Another argued that it
created a "bondage . .. more terrible than that of any system of
taskmasters the world has known since Israel was captive in
Egypt."' 157 One even argued that the Freedmen's Bureau itself
58
violated the Thirteenth Amendment.1

Carried to its extreme, this argument broke loose from its
constitutional moorings and become a statement of extraordinary
audacity. Apologists for slavery, conditioned by years of obedience
from those whose very lives they controlled, claimed that masters
cared about the well-being of their slaves more than abolitionists
ever could. 159 Senator Willey, not even the most radical defender
152. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2971 (1864) (statement of Sen.
Grimes); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2933 (1864) (statement of Sen.
Willey: "[A]fter as close and careful an examination of this bill as I have been
able to give to it, its proper title would be 'A bill to reenslave freedmen."').
153. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 3336 (1864) (statement of Sen.
Hicks).
154. "The men who are to go down there and become overseers and negrodrivers will be that description of men who are too lazy to work and just a
little too honest to steal." 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 1308 (1865) (statement of Sen.
Powell).
155. Id. at 985 (statement of Sen. Lane of Indiana).
156. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 894 (1864) (statement of Rep.
Wadsworth).
157. Id. at 3349 (statement of Sen. McDougall).
158. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 649 (1866) (statement of Rep.
Trimble).

159.

"I, for one, am unwilling that my slaves when freed shall become the
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of slavery, spoke of how it consoled him to know that his former
slaves must pray for him every day "because through me they
have been made free."' 160 Representative Ritter may have gone
still further when he argued that only the work of the Bureau had
led the freedmen to the "great error" of believing that their former
masters had not always acted in their best interest. Not their
enemy, the former slave-owner was, in his opinion, the freedmen's
"warmest friend."1 6 1
Supporters of the Freedmen's Bureau insisted repeatedly that
the Bureau did not and would not oppress its charges. Senator
Sumner repeatedly referred to the police as exercising
"superintendence" over all of the population, and asserted that the
Bureau would no more "fetter"16 2 the freedmen, than the police of
the District of Columbia tyrannized the Congress.' 63
This
argument, though, remained lively throughout the duration of the
Bureau and beyond.
E. Oppressionof Whites
The most chilling arguments to the modern reader are those
based on overt notions of white supremacy.
A group of
Congressmen, which included but was never limited to slaveowners from the Border States, openly argued that the United
16 4
States had always been a country by and for white people.
Before the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment, such men
warned against the "hideous form and repulsive features of
165
abolitionism."
The abolitionists had long referred to the unfulfilled but
sweeping rhetoric of liberty in America. To this, opponents of the

slaves of others." CONG.

GLOBE,

38th Cong., 1st Sess. 3336 (1864) (statement

of Sen. Hicks). Senator Hicks, a Marylander, also claimed that the cruelest
slave drivers were northerners. Id.
160. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2975 (1864).
161. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 636 (1866).
162. A term used by Kentucky Senator Wadsworth, CONG. GLOBE 38th
Cong., 1st Sess. 894 (1864).

163. Id. at 2971.
164. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 3342 (1864) (statement of Sen.
Davis); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 541 (1866) (statement of Rep.
Dawson).
165. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 801 (1864) (statement of Rep.
Dawson).
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Freedmen's Bureau replied that the Declaration of Independence
simply "did not comprehend the Negro" and that the revolution

and the writing of the Constitution were "actions that were
conducted by the Caucasian race alone in the fulfillment of their
own destiny and to secure their own rights."' 66
Opponents of the Bureau warned, too, about a general
overturning of the social order: if all men became educated "who
would black boots and curry the horses, who would do the menial
offices of the world?"16 7 They conjured images of a new class of
"lazzaroni," a large group of freed blacks enervated by government
philanthropy and happily embracing their destiny as locusts upon
the harvest of the hard work of America's white citizenry. 6 8 They

dismissed the notion that the Freedmen's Bureau would be selfsupporting because "Sambo . . . will raise nothing to pay the
9

rent."16
One recurring comment that speaks loudly about the nature
of the underlying assumptions of mid-nineteenth-century society
was directed to the attendance in the galleries.
Several
Congressmen who argued that the Bureau made freedmen lazy
and unwilling to work for themselves pointed to those in
attendance watching the debates. "[L]ook around upon these
galleries at any time of the day" said Delaware's Senator
Saulsbury, "and you see the beneficiaries of this Freedmen's
Bureau crowding your galleries."' 7 0 He claimed that this showed
them to be "too lazy or too worthless to support themselves."' 7 1 It
seems unlikely that the galleries of the House and Senate were
empty of black and white alike before the onset of the Civil War.
The modern reviewer cannot but recognize the abhorrent double
standard: whites attending legislative sessions must have been
doing their civic duty; blacks doing the same were showing
166. Id. at 3342 (statement of Sen. Davis).
167. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 342 (1866) (statement of Sen.
Cowan).

168. Id. at 396 (statement of Sen. Davis). Senator Davis explained this

term by making the horrific allegation that "[a] negro will never work when
he can keep soul and body together without work. ... If he can live by
begging, he will not work. If he can live by stealing, he will not work." Id.
See also id. at 743 (statement of Sen. Guthrie).
169. Id. at 362 (statement of Sen. Saulsbury).
170.
171.

Id.
Id.
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themselves to be lazy and shiftless and dependent on government
handouts. 172 Perhaps the saddest observation regarding this line
of arguments is that Congressmen favoring the Bureau did not
rise to object that comments on the blacks - but not the whites in the gallery disclosed racism in the speaker rather than lack of
industry in the audience.
The overtly white supremacist arguments may have reached a
bizarre high water mark during the speech of a Westerner,
Senator McDougall of California. On January 24, 1866, he rose in
the well of the Senate and claimed that the Bureau was
particularly vicious because it attempted to lift the black man
above his station, from which "he may fall so profoundly that he
will sink into the nether depths. 1' 73 Citing the fact that he
himself only possessed "red and white blood," he recognized his
kinship with "the Pelasgians, who drove the Egyptians out of
Greece, and the Hyperboreans, who became the demigods of that
same country, from whom Theseus and Hercules are supposed to
174
have descended, white-haired, great, godlike looking men."
Decrying the "debasement" of mixed bloods, he insisted that the
failures of "the Numidian," "the Cartheginian," and all of Asia
showed fully the superiority of whites. 75 He demanded to know
who of "old Norse ancestry" could ever agree to share government
76
with "those who come up out of central Africa.'
An only slightly less shocking argument was based on a
principle of alleged equality.
Representatives and senators
bewailed the oppression of the white man, and urged what would
in later years be called a "color-blind" view of the Constitution.
Representative Ritter of Kentucky complained that the removal of
property from whites would drive that race completely from the
affected states, leaving only freed blacks in the land of the former
Confederacy. 177 Senator Richardson of Illinois complained that
the bill required whites to support blacks, and that both the

172.

Id. at 397 (statement of Sen. Willey).
Id. at 401.
174. Id.
173.

175.

176.

Id.
Id. McDougall insisted that there was not a single example, not even

"Fred. Douglass" who was "a grave, careful, considerate, and high reasoning

man." Id.
177.

Id. at 635.
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President and Congress were showing "exclusive regard for the
interests of the Negro."'17 8 He predicted that such efforts would
fail because "God has made the negro inferior, and such laws
cannot make him equal."'179 Representative Marshall lamented
the tragic losses of those who "unfortunately... are white men...
and so the claim which they send up from their impoverished
homes is not listened to."' 180

Members of the House heard the

"plaintive voices" of starving children whose white mothers could
not feed them "because all she owns has been turned over to the
colored people."'18 1 They also were asked to leave the freedmen "to
make a living in the same way that the poor whites of our country
182
are doing."'
The extent to which the arguments were always interwoven
appeared in the statement of Senator Johnson. He claimed that
no Constitutional authority could be found to provide for the
freedmen "because he is black; it must be because he is a citizen;
and that reason being equally applicable to the white man as to
the black man, it would follow that we have the authority to clothe
' 183
and educate and provide for all citizens of the United States.
Thus he assumed that the Constitution must be color-blind; in his
definition this meant that there could be no legislation which
differed by race. From that premise he concluded that if the
Bureau existed there could be no limits whatsoever to federal
power.
VIII. THE RESPONSES

Despite the claim of some opponents that the Radical
Republicans put party ahead of national interests and
184
constitutional integrity because of their numerical superiority,
the supporters of the Bureau seem to have taken their legislative
duties seriously.
It was commonly said in the debates by
opponents of progressive legislation - whether the Freedmen's
Bureau, or the Civil Rights Act, or the Confiscation Acts - that the
178.
179.
180.

CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2801 (1864).
Id. at 2802.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 630 (1866).

181.

Id. at 636 (statement of Rep. Ritter).

182.

Id. at 2780 (statement of Rep. Le Blond).

183. Id. at 372.
184. Id. at 371 (statement of Sen. Davis).
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majority had no regard for the Constitution at all. In 1864 an
opponent of the Bureau rose to define his mission as "one and
single: the advocacy of civil liberty."' 8 5 By the summer of 1866
that same senator would intone, "I know that it is perfectly
useless to appeal to the Constitution of the United States. It is a
86
dead letter."'
Contrary to those notions, the proponents of the Bureau
appear to have been honest in their advocacy, and repeated their
conviction that their commitment was no less than that of their
opponents, although their interpretations of the document
obviously differed.1 8 7
They grew weary of the repeated
Constitutional cloaking of arguments by their foes within
Congress throughout the war. By 1868, Thomas Eliot would note
with exasperation that "when Fort Sumter was fired upon those
same gentlemen found no constitutional ground upon which to
justify the shelling of Charleston by the national forces."188
Nevertheless, throughout the debates over the Freedmen's Bureau
its supporters defended their proposals in not only political but
also constitutional terms.
They did so with a variety of
understandings ranging from the conventional to the quite
surprising.
A. The War Power
From the introduction of the very first bill, some defenders
consistently based its constitutionality upon the war powers of the
federal government. In describing the legitimacy of his proposal,
Eliot noted that emancipation had occurred as a war measure, and
that freedom came "for our own selfish ends. It was to weaken the
enemy. It was as a means of crushing the rebellion."18 9 Eliot
referred to both presidential and congressional powers in finding
the authority for the freeing of the enemy's slaves. 190 He found

185. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess., 2967 (1864) (statement of Sen.
Saulsbury).
186. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3841 (1866) (statement of Sen.
Saulsbury).
187. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 3306 (1864) (statement of Sen.
Trumbull).
188. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1815 (1868).
189. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 569 (1864).
190. Id. at 572.
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that a duty followed inevitably from emancipation: "we had no
right to decree freedom and not to guaranty safe guidance and
protection." 91
This theme never lost its significance in the arguments that
followed. The Bureau was designed, it was said in 1864, "to
shorten the war." 192 A Senator later added that the laws of
nations, to include those of war, were an integral part of the
93
Constitution, and of all governments.1
By the debates of 1866 the opponents of the Bureau
repeatedly asserted that the war was over. They pointed to the
President's announcement of the end of hostilities and claimed
that there could be no state of war after hostilities ceased.' 94 They
focused again and again on the factual state of affairs-the
disbanding of Confederate armies and return of most U.S. military
volunteers to civilian life-and claimed that everyone knew that
the war was over. 195
In response, congressional Republicans noted that there were
still federal troops throughout the South, 196 and that the United
States Army was routinely required to issue orders to govern
affairs there. 19 7 The House sponsor of the Bureau bill argued that
there could never be lasting peace until the rights for which the
war was fought were guaranteed. 19 8
Some modern commentators have recognized the Freedmen's
Bureau's birth in war and continuing "military character" that
resulted from being broadly populated by military officers. 199
Indeed, under a conventional limited view of the powers of the
federal government, this seems sound footing for the original bill.
It became more problematic from 1866 on for a number of reasons.
Initially, as the President argued in his veto measure, 200 many

191.

Id. at 569.

192. Id. at 741 (statement of Rep. Cole).
193. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 365 (1866) (statement of Sen.
Fessenden).
194. Id. at 363 (statement of Sen. Saulsbury).
195. Id. at 369 (statement of Sen. Hendricks); Id. at 335 (statement of Sen.

Guthrie).
196. Id. at 656 (statement of Sen. Eliot).
197. Id. at 631 (statement of Rep. Moulton).
198. Id. at 2773 (statement of Rep. Eliot).
199. See, e.g., KACZOROWSKI, supra note 17, at 25.
200. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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Americans viewed the war as ending in 1865. More importantly,
the expansion bill extended the activities of the Bureau far beyond
20 1
a wartime rationale in both time and space.
B. Treason
An argument somewhat related to the war powers
justification may be found in the response of some exasperated
Congressmen to the repeated use of the limited powers argument.
Some noted that the states of the Confederacy were the violators
of the constitutional order. These Congressmen argued that
"necessity has compelled the Government to lay its hand on
traitors and to hinder them from pulling down the fabric of our
Government. '202 One was thankful to "God that this nation has
risen to the point of using every implement that the Almighty and
'203
common sense have put in it[s] hands to crush the rebellion.
Any means by which the rebels could be stopped, and any
punishment meted out to them, were therefore legitimate. For
these Republicans, the rebellion justified any method used to end
it.
Senator Trumbull, certainly no radical in 1864, used this
argument in response during the struggle over the initial bill.
Opponents challenged Trumbull over the plan to allow the
Freedmen's Bureau to sell confiscated land to freed slaves. They
argued that such a permanent deprivation of property from the
families of slaveholders violated the Constitution prohibition on
attainder of the blood. 204 Asked how he could reconcile such
property sales with the Constitution, he bristled "I reconcile it...
in the same way that I reconcile with it the right to shoot a traitor,
to destroy him, to destroy his property and everything that he has
'20 5
for the purpose of putting down this wicked rebellion.
This justification, then, was based on the notion that the
authority to shoot a traitor itself included the right to take any
lesser means, such as land redistribution. It was, as noted above,
occasionally uttered in debates even by men who primarily relied
201.

See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.

202. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2967 (1864) (statement of Sen.
Ten Eyck).
203. Id. at 3349 (statement of Rep. Chandler).
204. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2.
205. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 3304 (1864).
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on other explanations, but was never a significant part of the
debate. It is easy to see why. On the one hand, the argument was
subject to the same limitations as the sounder one based on war
powers: it seemed to expire at least in 1866, and could never
justify an expansion into states which had not seceded. It had,
too, an additional disadvantage not shared by the war powers
approach: it smacked of cruelty and revenge, rather than national
survival. It was an angry response in an argument, but could
never carry much weight as a serious constitutional theory.
C. Privileges,Immunities, and the Black Codes
By the time its advocates sought to expand the powers of the
Freedmen's Bureau in 1866, these arguments were less
compelling. Many remained convinced that a state of war still
existed and would continue to exist until relations between the
federal government and the states of the Confederacy were
completely normalized; some even took the view that punishment
remained to be meted out by the victors. There was nonetheless a
feeling of peace across much of the country, and that mood was
felt in Congress. Additionally, as the proponents of the Bureau
sought to expand its duties into Border States that had never
seceded and were thus impossible to justify within the war power,
they had to find other bases. One that modern observers might
find surprising was based on the Privileges and Immunities
06
Clause.2
Although he did not explicitly cite that clause, Representative
Donnelly gave a good synopsis of the argument linking it to the
expanded power to be given the Bureau to protect the freedman. 207
He noted that "having made the slave a freedman, the nation
needs some instrumentality which shall reach to every portion of
the South and stand between the freedman and oppression. '2 08
206. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 319 (1866) (statement of Sen.
Trumbull); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
207. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 585 (1866).
208. Id. A Minnesota populist, Representative Donnelly, had no love for
Southern institutions, and openly spoke the necessity for a radical cure to the
disease of slavery.
He warned that if nothing were done to prevent
reenslavement in another form, the Civil War would be fought over and over
again in Congress; and that "the children of these people would be educated
to reverence the leaders of the rebellion, and to place Lee beside Washington
in the niches of their hearts." Id.
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That oppression, in the form of the black codes, had recently
made itself manifest. Sometimes merely reworded versions of the
old laws designed to preserve slavery, and sometimes wholly new
laws designed to ensure the suppression of the freedmen, these
codes were widely adopted by the standing legislatures of the
South. Such codes allowed for such slavery-like legal constructs as
forced apprenticeship of children, a ban on land ownership by
blacks, and criminal judgments of vagrancy against freedmen who
had not agreed to contracts with plantation owners. 209 Even in a
non-seceding state like Kentucky, blacks could not testify against
whites or own a firearm, and crimes committed by blacks were
subject to far more severe punishment than those committed
2 10
against them.
Interestingly, although most of the opponents of the Bureau
simply ignored the black codes, 2 11 a few proudly proclaimed them
as proof of the allegedly wise policies of state legislatures. Senator
Garret Davis, for example, admitted that his state imposed only
confinement upon a white man convicted of rape, but "when
perpetrated by a negro upon a white woman, it is punishable by
death.'' 212 He announced to his colleagues that no amount of
pressure would make Kentucky change that law, that it would
stand "until the last trump blows. '2 13 The following day he rose
again to refer approvingly to a lynching that occurred a few years
earlier in Missouri. 2 14 Reminding the Senate that his state
punished rapists differently based on the color of their skin, he
threatened that "the people of Kentucky will punish the black
criminal by hanging him, and all the Freedmen's Bureaus that
could be created by Congress will be insufficient to give him
immunity from such a just punishment. '2 15 Faced by such
celebrations of racism even as war power arguments faded, it is
unsurprising that the Republicans continued to cast about for
some rationale for this bold increase in Congressional power.
209.

Id. at 588-89.

210.

Id. at 651.

211.

"The people have ceased to believe ...that the white men are

oppressing these colored persons." CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 3054
(1868) (statement of Sen. Hendricks).
212. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 397 (1866).
213. Id.

214.

Id. at 418.

215.

Id.
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D. The Thirteenth Amendment
One place that a few members of Congress found such
authorization
was the second section of "the Great
Amendment. ''2 16 Some Bureau supporters argued that slavery
existed in many forms, and that the black codes were simply the
outlawed practice in another disguise. Some of the supporters of
the expansion bill found their constitutional authorization
precisely in that clause. 2 17 Representative Eliot himself argued
that the power to legislate to end slavery would have been implicit
even in the first section of the amendment, but the second
explicitly gave power to Congress to enact any measure necessary
'2 18
to secure "the great grant of freedom.
This is probably the least surprising basis for the Freedmen's
Bureau, or at least its expansion, to modern ears. The Supreme
Court has long accepted the notion that the legislative grant
contained in the Thirteenth Amendment included the power to
eliminate what Senator Trumbull had called "the badges of
servitude."

2 19

It is odd, then, to find so few references to the Great
Amendment

in

the

debates.

Despite

a seemingly

obvious

connection of the Bureau to the elimination of a systematic
servitude, few members of Congress invoked it in defending

Commissioner Howard's beleaguered agency.
Perhaps the reason can be found in the responses to these few
proclamations by the Bureau's enemies. Opponents countered
that the Amendment, as adopted by the States, did not grant any
further power to the national government to regulate "matters of
domestic concern." 220 If legal oppression was the same as slavery,
asked one, what was to be done regarding California, where
216. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2 ("Congress shall have the power to
enforce this article by appropriate legislation.").
217. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 630 (1866) (statement of Rep.
Hubbard).

218. Id. at 2773.
219. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 424 n.31 (1968). It
should be noted that the Court in Jones, one footnote earlier, referred to the
Freedmen's Bureau, although without citing its own constitutional source.
Id. at 423. The implication that the Bureau was justified under the
Thirteenth Amendment is a strong one.
220. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 623 (1866) (statement of Rep.
Kerr).
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"legislation discriminates against a class of Asians" or Illinois,
which did not grant "all the privileges and immunities" to blacks
that were available for whites? 22 ' Although an occasional Senator
would justify the Bureau as a temporary transition between
slavery and freedom, 222 it is possible that the haunting presence of
other forms of discrimination prevented some moderate members
of Congress from pressing too hard the argument that the Bureau
was a legitimate exercise of Thirteenth Amendment authority.
E. Necessity
Quite the contrary from a Thirteenth Amendment argument
that we might well find more persuasive today than they did then,
was a more general justification which rang throughout the
debates: need. Building upon Thomas Eliot's observation that the
war effort of emancipation created a duty, some Congressmen
embraced a theory that the necessity for action created its own
justification. Freely admitting that the initial bill opened "a new
field for legislation," Hiram Price agreed with his opponents that
there was no explicit authorization for the Bureau. 2 23 But, he
observed, "neither is there for saving the passengers and crew of a
sinking ship, or extinguishing a conflagration, or doing a thousand
'2 24
other things that require to be done.
Probably because his version of the bill would have placed it
in the Treasury Department, Charles Sumner focused more on a
general necessity theory than the war powers when he introduced
the 1864 bill in the Senate. Unlike Eliot, who had cited all of the
military provisions of the Constitution in his initial speech,
Sumner never referred to that document at all. Instead, he read
from report after report documenting the need for relief of the
former slaves, and the inability of private aid societies to meet
His argument ultimately was built on the
that need. 2 25
of
any organization except the federal government
ineffectiveness
to resolve the problems at hand, and he concluded that "the
national Government must interfere in this case precisely as in
221. Id. at 628 (statement of Rep. Marshall).
222. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2798 (1864) (statement of Sen.
Sumner).

223. Id. at 888.
224. Id.
225.

Id. at 2798-99.
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'226
building the Pacific railroad.
In addition to railroad building, other supporters pointed to
support for immigration as an example of a federal power not
restricted to enumerated powers. Representative Kelley noted
that Congress regularly appropriated funds to care for and
educate immigrants. 227 He argued that this action demonstrated
the power to bring people into "the great temple of American
civilization. '228 One opponent declared this comparison irrelevant
because "[w]e invite the immigrant from abroad, '229 while fortunes
of war thrust the freedman upon the federal government.
Significantly, this response does not really contest Kelley's
argument that there are concrete powers which Congress may
legitimately pursue which are only tenuously connected to the
enumerated powers of Article I; it merely argues that the
condition which creates the need must arise from some other
government action in order to justify the new exercise of power.
Yet more constitutional evidence was found in the emergency
support for Native Americans, especially in winter. In part of a
continuing attempt to keep resettled Indians upon reservations,
the federal government sometimes provided food and clothing.
Congress had appropriated a half million dollar appropriation as
recently as a month before the introduction of the Freedmen's

Bureau expansion bill in 1866.230

From this example, the bill's

sponsor, Senator Trumbull, derived the principle that the federal
government was always granted the power to feed a "helpless
23 1
population.
226.
227.

CONG.
CONG.

GLOBE,
GLOBE,

38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2799 (1864).
38th Cong., 2d Sess. 692 (1865).

228. Id.
229. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 693 (1865) (statement of Rep.
Chanler).
230. CONG. GLOBE 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 319 (1866).
231. Id. At least one scholar views statements like these not as pointing
to a generalized role for necessity in constitutional interpretation, but as a
demonstration of humanitarian relief as a legitimate congressional function
under the Taxing and Spending Clause. See Michele Landis Dauber, Forum:
"Overtaken by a Great Calamity" Disaster Relief and the Origins of the
American Welfare State: The Sympathetic State, 23 LAw & HIST. REV. 387
(2005). Professor Dauber makes a very compelling argument that the Bureau
was part of a tradition of emergency relief, although admittedly it was much
greater than what had come before. See id. at 408-19. She may well be right
that several of the lawmakers I see as setting forth a broad necessity
argument were in fact only arguing for a more limited, but still expansive,
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Still another example of expansive, unwritten federal power
occurred after the outlawing of the slave trade.
When, as
occasionally happened, a slave ship inadvertently landed on an
American shore, federal legislation authorized the Executive
232
Branch to feed them and transport them back to Africa.
Opponents refused to concede that this principle was
operative at all in the constitutional system, 2 33 or argued that the
necessity had been caused by the Republican's conduct of the war.
Representative Shanklin demanded that no use of necessity be
afforded the "fanatical abolitionists" who had "by promises,
persuasions, and misrepresentations.., demoralized the Negroes,
who were a contented, quiet, and peaceable class heretofore, well
fed and well clothed. '234 He claimed that the Republicans had
"dragged" the slavery question into the war, and were therefore
estopped from arguing any expansion of federal power be based
upon it.235
IX. THE END OF THE BUREAU AND ITS LEGACY

A. Suffrage

Even before the passage of the first Freedmen's Bureau bill,
voices were raised in favor of extending the vote to freed slaves.
spending power. Ultimately, though, two arguments seem to me to support
the idea that at least some members of Congress viewed this enterprise as
outside of the taxing and spending power. Initially, the legislation went far
beyond disaster relief, encompassing jurisdiction and labor negotiations that
seem an ill-fit under the spending power, see supra note 83 and
accompanying text. Additionally, by assigning lands seized by the United
States to the Bureau, there was an expectation that the Bureau would be
wholly self-financing, and would require neither taxes nor appropriations, see
supra note 145 and accompanying text. Thus I view these comments as
pointing to a different constitutional principle than the Spending Clause,
although I admit Professor Dauber makes a convincing case that in
subsequent years many members of Congress used the Freedmen's Bureau as
an example of the spending power of Congress.
232. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 323 (1866). A law of 1860 had
provided that in such cases the President could lawfully provide "comfortable
clothing, shelter, and provisions for a period not exceeding one year from the
date of their being landed on the coast of Africa." Id. at 370; see also id. at
631.
233. Id. at 371 (statement of Sen. Davis).
234. Id. at 638.
235. Id.
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Although the two actions had much common ground and
ultimately numbered many of the same legislators among their
supporters, there were those who viewed the policies as
contradictory in nature. Representative of this view was Senator
Sprague, who argued consistently that enfranchisement was the
only meaningful protection that blacks would ever have. 236

He

proposed refusing seceded States return to constitutional relations
until they guaranteed that black men could vote. "When a man
'2 37
can vote," he said, "he needs no special legislation in his behalf.
The argument went in the other direction as well. Senator
Stewart strongly promoted the expansion of the Freedmen's
Bureau as "a practical measure" to protect civil rights. He
recoiled, however, from any provision of the right to vote, and
denounced those "who are determined to sacrifice the Union and
the Constitution unless they can achieve the right of suffrage for
the Negro."

238

In the earliest years of the Bureau, amid the throes of the
refugee crisis, proponents of the legislation could argue that the
vote would not feed or clothe helpless people. 2 39 As time went on,
the argument for suffrage became more difficult to oppose.
Virtually all of the Freedmen's Bureau supporters had always
advocated a temporary agency; this made it harder to insist on
continuing legislation for the Bureau as war and emancipation
receded into the past. One representative specifically assumed
that the Bureau - which he supported - was relief of short

duration that must be augmented by suffrage or "in a short time
'240
the Negro will relapse into oppression.
By the last days of the Bureau, as Congress debated the
future organization of its educational activities, suffrage had
become a vital part of the argument for its termination. Although
still critical of the fact that Congress had "overthrown sovereign
States and willfully violated the Constitution of your country to
make him a voter," Representative McNeely relied heavily upon
E.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 960 (1865).
Id. See also id. at 985 (statement of Sen. Lane of Indiana); CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 745 (1866) (statement of Sen. Henderson).
The Nevadan
238. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 297 (1866).
William Stewart was one of those who did see the Freedmen's Bureau as
236.
237.

authorized by Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment. Id.
239. Id. at 746 (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
240. Id. at 590 (statement of Rep. Donnelly).
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suffrage to argue that blacks should now be unprotected by the
24 1
Freedmen's Bureau.
B. The Aftermath
Even the final closure of the Bureau did not end the battles
over it.242 All of the parties seemed to understand that the stakes
in the fight for the future of the freedmen - and the United States
- were high enough that the retrospective battle was important as
well. Upon its closure paeans of praise rang out from supporters
243
for the noble work it had done.
Almost immediately, however, the counterattack began. As
the Reconstruction chapter of American history closed, the
Southern white perspective, which was to give birth to the "Lost
Cause" mythology, took particular aim at the Freedmen's Bureau.
One of the interesting features of this attack was how frequently
it featured ideas first raised during the life of the Bureau by men
like Andrew Johnson and Garret Davis. The post-Reconstruction
writers argued that the Bureau had been an unconstitutional
aggrandizement of congressional power, that it had been unfair to
the white people of the South, and that it had been a corrupt
political tool of Republican power.
The argument that the Bureau was constructed for narrow
political advantage had begun during its life. Senator Hendricks
had argued in 1868 that the Bureau was bad for both blacks and
whites, but Congress maintained it to ensure that there was a
"special partisan" in every county in the South to organize and
There were even a few
control that fall's elections. 244
contemporaries and supporters who thought that a political role
for the Bureau was appropriate; Senator Patterson of New
CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1995 (1870).
242. The Bureau ended in a series of legislative contractions. As Southern
241.

States were readmitted, it lost judicial authority in those places; its available
land continued to shrink precipitously; and ultimately it was reduced to
educational activities and assisting black soldiers recover bounties due them
for their wartime service, until it was finally closed at the end of June, 1872.
PEIRCE, supra note 19, at 73-74.
243. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 2295 (1870) (statement of Rep.
Arnell, prophesying that a historian of the era will "point with wonder and
admiration to this lily that grew out of and covered with its blossoms the
dank and gaping grave of war").
244.

CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 3054 (1868).
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Hampshire, for instance, saw nothing wrong with agents, in their
private capacities, organizing Union leagues to get out the vote for
the Republican ticket. 24 5 As some members of Congress became
authors, they repeated the charge: former Representative Cox,
who had engaged in a shocking racist screed in 1864,246 turned
historian twenty-four years later to write that the Bureau's
purpose had been "to perpetuate the existence of the Republican
party." 247
Throughout much of the twentieth century, the majority view
of the Bureau was drawn from the words of its historic opponents.
Mainstream historical texts called the Bureau a corrupt abuser of
public trust, an unfair judge of oppressed whites, the cause of
racial disharmony in the post-war South, and a primarily political
organization. 248 In more recent days, a number of revisionist
historians, recovering a more balanced view of Reconstruction

24 9
generally, have reevaluated the Freedmen's Bureau as well.
One ironic feature of the more recent revisionist views of the
Bureau is that they have occasionally also adopted the arguments
of the Bureau's opponents.
Because these modern authors
genuinely sympathize with the plight of the freedmen, they
express frustration over the limited accomplishments of the
Bureau. 250 Although some have noted the persistent opposition by
President Johnson and congressional opponents, many have
identified corruption and other problems within the Bureau

itself. 25 1

Others

have been

affected by the reenslavement

245. Id. at 3057.

246. Cox ranted about an abolitionist plot to encourage interracial
marriage. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 712 (1864). He warned that in
a year or two a New Englander would seek the establishment of "a
department for the hybrids who are cast upon the care of the Government by
this system of miscegenation." Id. He warned, however, that "the mulatto
does not live; he does not recreate his kind; he is a monster." Id.
247. PEIRCE, supra note 19, at 170.
248. BENTLEY, supra note 19, at 202 (claiming that Grant was elected
president only because of the black vote, and that the Bureau "thoroughly
accomplished one of its original tasks, that of helping the Radical politicians
keep their party in power").
249. See, e.g., RECONSIDERATIONS, supra note 21.
250. NIEMAN, supra note 72, at 222.
251. See, e.g., CLAUDE F. OUBRE, FORTY ACRES AND A MULE: THE
FREEDMEN'S BUREAU AND BLACK LAND OWNERSHIP 192-236 (1978) ("[T]he fact

remains that the majority of the minor bureau agents were white northerners
who felt no moral obligation to the freedmen. Indeed, many were dishonest
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argument, 2 52 arguing that the Bureau was more concerned with
the freedmen's willingness to work than their well-being. 253 One
author even criticized Congress for taking limited half-measures
to implement real freedom, of being more devoted to a
conservative reading of the Constitution than to the well-being of
2 54
black Americans.
C. Revival and Respect
Yet there have always been even-tempered views of the
Bureau as well. W.E.B. DuBois offered an early corrective with
his review of the Bureau for Atlantic Monthly in .1901.255 Later
authors, although not uncritical, noted the Bureau's "daunting"
2 56
range of duties and extremely limited personnel and funds.
LaWanda Cox took particular efforts to correct the notion that the
Bureau was a political arm of the Republican Party.257
The Freedmen's Bureau's work as an administrative body has
recently received praise as well.
Serving as it did as the
258
government agency legitimizing and recording marriages,
supervising labor contracts, and recording land transfers, its
historical value is finally being recognized. For social research as
well as personal genealogy, the papers of the Bureau are unique
records of a group of Americans in time. Because the records have
been subject to a level of neglect analogous to the Bureau's
disfavor in twentieth century historiography, it became necessary
for Congress, once again, to act. So in 2000, yet one more piece of
legislation concerned this unusual Bureau: the Freedmen's
and used their positions for personal and political gain.").
252. See supra notes 153-163 and accompanying text.
253. See, e.g., FONER, supra note 20, at 157 ("[T]he Bureau, like the Army,
seemed to consider black reluctance to labor the greater threat to its
economic mission.").
254. NIEMAN, supra note 72, at 222.
255. The article was republished in SOULS OF BLACK FOLK, supra note 36.
256. FONER, supra note 20, at 142-43.
257. LaWanda Cox, General 0.0. Howard and the "Misrepresented
Bureau",in FREEDOM, RACISM, AND RECONSTRUCTION: COLLECTED WRITINGS OF

LAWANDA COX 149, 156 (Donald G. Nieman ed., 1997).
258. Congress had never provided for this function, but Howard
authorized his subordinates, "in places where the local statutes make no
provisions for the marriage of persons of color ...to designate officers who
should keep a record of marriages, which might be solemnized by any
ordained minister of the gospel." HOWARD, supra note 27, at 223.
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enactment,

legislation regarding the Bureau may have finally come to a close.
X. A

SENSE OF CONSTITUTIONAL IMAGINATION

Ultimately the proponents of the Bureau, and advocates of
It was
Reconstruction generally, faced a grave dilemma.
unquestionably true that the constitutional forms of the nation's
history were wholly inadequate to the crisis at hand. It was
equally true that the federal government could not simply stand
idly by and watch tragedies unfold. In the words of W.E.B.
DuBois, the latter always proved to be the unanswerable
argument confronting the opponents: that the deeds "manifestly
must be done," and that the government must therefore have the
power to do them. 260 It was in facing this conundrum that these
men demonstrated the extent, and limits, of their imagination.
A. Extension of Necessary Powers
The proponents of the Freedmen's Bureau always had more
rhetorical work to do than their opponents did. In addition to the
inherent inertial strength of the status quo, advocates of new roles
for government in the United States must always contend with
the idea that the enumerated powers not only define the federal
government, but must be read in a severely limiting way. The
Bureau's own supporters divided over this idea. Many thus
couched their support for the Bureau in intricate constructions of
specific provisions. Some, however, refused to allow their thinking
about the American Republic to be limited to repetitions of already
accomplished feats.
Representative Cole of California early propounded the view
that the past was not a boundary. Asserting that "[p]recedent is
only respectable when it accords with right reason, '26 1 he avowed
259. Pub. L. No. 106-444 (2000). The Act appropriated three million
dollars for the National Archives to microfiche and index the Bureau's
records. As the findings portion of the originally introduced House
Resolution noted, the Bureau's documents "contain a wide range of data
about the African-American experience during slavery and freedom,
including in marriage records, labor contracts, Government rations and back
pay records, and indentured contracts for minors." H.R. 5157, 106th Cong. §
2 (10).

260.

DuBoIS, supra note 36, at 53.

261.

CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 743 (1864).
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that his colleagues should not be limited to the past any more
than the patriots of the American Revolution had been. Speaking
at a time before the Thirteenth Amendment committed the nation
to a path of freedom, Cole claimed that slavery had "forfeited
'262
every semblance of right to recognition.
Some Republicans openly embraced a constitutional view that
allowed for evolution.
William Kelley of Pennsylvania,
denouncing stagnation and proclaiming that "mutation is the law
of our life, '263 called upon his colleagues to look to the future. "It
is no answer," he said "to say that there has never been a
Freedmen's Bureau before. '264 Senator Hale urged his colleagues
to stop focusing on the "dead past" and instead make precedents
for "our children in coming generations for just such a time as this
if it should ever come again. ' 26 5 He compared those demanding
limits to enumerated powers to an Episcopal priest refusing to
pray for a man gored by a bull because "there was nothing of that
'266
sort in the prayer-book.
Senator Fessenden, later to be the Attorney General,
specifically rejected
the principle of expressio unis in
constitutional interpretation.
He argued that the "lawyer's
argument" that the statement of one thing necessarily excluded
unstated things was wholly inappropriate where the nation faced
''a state of facts that could not be contemplated before they
arose. '26 7 In a colloquy with Senator Hendricks he noted that
Congress had also appropriated money for seeds to be distributed
by the Agriculture Bureau, an act which was equally without
literal support in the Constitution. 268
Perhaps the grandest statement of imagination of all came
from Ignatius Donnelly, the firebrand from Minnesota.
In
February 1866 he outlined his rejection of the literalist, grudging
approach to the founding document:
[T]his is a new birth of the nation. The Constitution will
hereafter be read by the light of the rebellion; by the light
262.

Id.

263. Id. at 772.
264. Id. at 775.
265.
266.
267.
268.

Id. at 3308.
Id.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 366 (1866).
Id. at 369.
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of the emancipation; by the light of that tremendous
uprising of the intellect of the world going on everywhere
around us. He is indeed fearfully cramped by the old
technicalities who can see in this enormous struggle only
the suppression of a riot and the dispersion of a mob.
This struggle has been as organic in its great meanings
as the Constitution itself. It will leave its traces upon our
Government and laws so long as the nation continues to
269
exist.
B. An Eye to the Future
Even most Radical Republicans were unwilling to go as far as
Ignatius Donnelly; they did go quite far, however, and offer the
modern United States a vision of how a constitutional imagination
can be put to use. Occasionally the Congressmen who spoke
offered moments of rare and real insight. Because they confronted
a crisis of great need and little precedent, they had to find new
ways to view their situation. One such vision occurred when
Representative Hubbard of Connecticut advocated simultaneously
a color-blind Constitution and a progressive view of the
Freedmen's Bureau. He first noted the continuing dangers of
racism.
"The words caste, race, color, ever unknown to the
Constitution, notwithstanding the immortal amendment giving
freedom to all, are still potent for evil on the lips of men whose
minds are swayed by prejudice or blinded by passion, and the
freedmen need the protection of this bill. ' 270

He justified the

protection of the freedmen by linking them to the ideals of "men of
all nations, of all kindreds and tongues" who came "to worship at
1
freedom's shrine. '27
In returning to the ideals of the Declaration of Independence,
in resolutely attaching himself to the cause of liberty and
269.

Id. at 586.

Representative Donnelly may be subject to many

criticisms, but lack of imagination is certainly not one of them. After his
career in Congress as a Republican he founded his own political party, and
wrote books "proving" that Atlantis was a large, long-lasting settlement
between Africa and South America, that a terrible comet had struck earth in
man's prehistory, and that Francis Bacon wrote the plays attributed to
William Shakespeare. RIDGE, supra note 23, at 198, 204, 228.
270. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 630 (1866).

271.

Id.

2006]

CONSTITUTIONAL IMAGINATION

119

constitutional government, Hubbard offered nothing less than a
possible solution to discriminatory problems then and now. His
assessment as a legislator was that racial discrimination was real,
and pervasive: the freedmen "need schools and protection. '272 Yet
he worked within a Constitution he insisted must be free of race
and caste. His understanding of these two principles led him to
believe that the Constitution did not require blindness of any kind
of the legislatures. Indeed, Congress had a duty to see acts of
unfairness perpetrated by individuals, or even by the States
themselves.
In removing racist obstructions, in moving the
country to the state of color-blindness required by the
Constitution, Hubbard's solution allowed Congress and federal
instrumentalities to consider the factual setting of the nation.
Indeed, he would demand the government use its powers to create
a color-blind society. The end, as envisioned by the Declaration,
must be blind as to one's personal race or situation; the means
need not be, and probably could not be.
For history needed then to be taken into account. As Thomas
Eliot noted, the story of the relation of the races had been that
"[w]e have done nothing to them, as a race, but injury. '273 To
those who claimed that slavery had Christianized the black
people, Eliot responded that the credit for that benefit went to
God, not to those who had enslaved other men. He observed that
an entire legal system had developed to keep slaves in their place
and said of the unfinished work of emancipation "we have struck
off their chains. Shall we not help them to find homes? They have
not had homes yet. We have not let them know the meaning of
274
the sacred name of home."

Mere emancipation did not remedy the past; rather, it created
a need. This, in turn, created a duty. That duty gave rise to a
corresponding power. The failures of the Freedmen's Bureau to
achieve its goals fully and accomplish its duties perfectly do not
take away from the extraordinary innovations inherent in its very
existence. For the first time, the federal government entered the
lives of individuals on a large scale in an endeavor to feed them,
clothe them, educate them, enable them to marry, and protect
272.
273.

Id.
Id. at 2779.
274. Id.
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them in their legal rights. General Howard himself believed that
the humanitarian spirit that led to the Bureau produced real
patriotism for the government, as it "was always hard to love a
Government which, theoretically, was a mere machine and which
could extend no sympathy to people in disaster."2 75 He believed
that the willingness of the United States to intervene led to a
growth of nationalism that would forever bind the country.
If General Howard was right, then the reward for the sense of
constitutional imagination shown by the supporters of the
Freedmen's Bureau was not in vain.
Those men showed
themselves willing to think creatively and take risks when facing
a crisis of extraordinary magnitude. Congressmen like Thomas
Eliot and Lyman Trumbull willed themselves and their colleagues
to go beyond the forms of the past not because they wished to
experiment with the Constitution, but because they had no choice.
They saw a large section of the American public in crisis, and
refused to turn away despite the fact that an intervention of this
kind had no precedent whatever in American history.
The story of federal power is incomplete without considering
the meaning given to the Constitution's short phrases by all of the
federal branches.
In their unprecedented actions the
Reconstruction Congress set forth their understanding of their
responsibilities, and the powers that must accompany them. The
deeds of the Freedmen's Bureau are at long last gaining some of
the credit that they merited. Perhaps it is now time also to
acknowledge a debt to the much-maligned radicals and recognize
that, at least at some times, Congress has the power to do what
"manifestly must be done."

275.

HOWARD, supra note 27, at 203.

